CHAPTER III
PALESTINIAN
ARAB CULTURE AND IDENTITY
1.
Arab Culture and the Influence of Islam
1.
Arab Culture and the Influence of
Islam
It is necessary at this juncture to
preface the historical-political dissertation by explaining the nature
of Arab culture and the influence of Islam on the international scene
since, inevitably, diverse cultural perspectives have a bearing on the
manner in which the Jewish and Arab populations in Palestine/Israel
view and deal with each other. As events globally have demonstrated,
the Israel-Arab conflict encompasses wider issues. The West in general
and Europe in particular, is now experiencing a potential threat to its
democratic values evidenced by an increasing penetration into its
culture of Islamic fundamentalism whose ideology rejects the validity
of and equality among differing belief systems.
Islamic theology as expressed in the Qu’ran
ignites and
fuels the divergence between cultures. It declares that Islam is
supreme and denigrates those who are non-Muslims. Such an ideology is
in conflict with western values and with those espoused particularly in
Although
Western readers may not
recognise a number of social and political factors inherent in Israeli
and Arab society as differing from their own, the Palestinian conflict
with the Jewish State of Israel must be viewed against a background of
Arab tradition rooted in tribal culture, upon which Qur’anic
doctrines have been superimposed. While these may change over time,
there are certain national characteristics of a people which are
generally accepted and globally recognised. For example, one
acknowledges as being valid: the English “stiff
upper
lip”, the German obsession with thoroughness, the Japanese
preoccupation with courtesy and honour, and Italian
volatility.
Psychologists have asserted that personality is predetermined by the
genetic blueprint which can produce important societal outcomes
mediated through outlook and behaviour.
Sania
Hamady, in her ‘Temperament
and Character of the Arabs’,
makes the point that while one
cannot categorise all Arabs as having the same characteristics, beliefs
and value systems, it is nevertheless possible to determine
through statistical analysis some basic core characteristics which may
be found in the majority of a population. Where the characteristics of
a particular population are examined, the frequency of specific
character identifiers can be represented on a graph expressed as a
symmetrical bell-shaped frequency-distribution curve with the mouth of
the bell facing downwards. In a commonly seen distribution-curve, the
most frequently expressed characteristics are located at the peak of
the curve – which generally appears in the middle as
‘normal’ curve, with individual exceptions and
deviations
from the majority being represented in the tail extremities of the
curve near and its base-line.
”[I]n
getting socialized, the individual embodies his culture and becomes a
representative of its patterns of behaviour and its values. Those
reared in the same social institutions tend to show certain
regularities that are common and salient in their behaviour.
Characteristic of them are central tendencies towards common ways of
thinking, acting and feeling. On these cultural regularities and
central tendencies in behaviour the concept of national character is
built. It stands for the common denominator of characteristics, with
individuals varying from it in different directions and degrees. This
concept does not correspond to the total personality of an individual,
but describes the pattern of the culturally regular character. In
studying the character of a cultural group one starts with certain
assumptions…[I]t is recognised that cultural
character
is subject to change and that as such, no statement about it can be
absolute." (p.12)
Two premises underlie
Hamady’s
description:
(i)
In statistical analysis
although individual personalities
may vary, the peak shows the generally
exhibited characteristics of a population.
(ii)
Different Arab
populations - such as Egyptians contrasted
with Libyans; Iraqis with Moroccans or Bedouin in contrast with
fellahin peasants – may show different centralising
tendencies
such that the
peak of bell curve is skewed in favour of certain characteristics while
the tails still account for individual deviations from the norm. The
same may be said in analysing the differences between Jewish and
Palestinian-Arab populations.
For sake of convenience and brevity some of these differences are
summarised below in point form. They have been derived from the seminal
works of Islamist authority, Professor Bernard Lewis, (‘The
Multiple Identities of
the
the current Israel-Palestine ideological political conflict in
particular: David Pryce-Jones, ‘The
Closed Circle’;
Raphael Patai, ‘The
Arab Mind’;
In Search for Legitimacy.
Salzman and Kedar in particular show how
the Arab tribal culture has a direct impact
on the
(
See also Salzman, The
Middle
East’s Tribal DNA
(“Tribal DNA”); The
Iron Law of Politics, Vol 23, No.2 Politics and Life
Sciences,
20, (“Iron
Law of Politics”)
where the
author argues that only two out of
“Equality”,”
Personal Freedom” and “Peace” can be
achieved at the
same time. All three values cannot be attained simultaneously http://www.meforum.org/article/1813
;
Richard
Landes, Salzman
on Tribal Islam: Insights of an Anthropologist,
The
Augean Stables, April 7, 2008, http://www.theaugeanstables.com/category/islam/
; also Edward
Said and the Culture of Honour and Shame:
Orientalism and Our Misperceptions of the Arab-Israeli Conflict,
13 Israel Affairs, Issue 4 October 2007, pages 844 - 858 http://www.theaugeanstables.com/conspiracy-theory-article/
; J.G. Peristiany, Honour
and Shame: The Values of
Mediterranean Society,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago,
1966;
These
references may provide the
non-professional lay reader with some insight into Arab culture and the
effect which some of its
characteristics impact on Israeli-Palestinian relations in particular, and
the increasing clash between
Islamic fundamentalism and Western democratic values in general.
The references may
assist in identifying the assumptions underlying decision-making in the
Arab world and the manner in which they differ
from the process in the West. A failure by the early Israeli leadership
and by the American, European and British politicians and diplomats
– especially the British - to understand these differences
and
take them into account has contributed
significantly to the continuation of the Arab-Jewish conflict:
*
Power
within Arab society is
structured upon tribal protocols and based upon
family kinship by virtue of which members are to be protected against
external attack and secured in their advancement beyond the family -
(witness Sadam Hussein’s power in Iraq). Salzman expresses it
thus:
“Arab
culture addresses security through "balanced
opposition"
in which everybody is a member
of a nested set of kin groups,
ranging from very small to very large.
These
groups are
vested
with
responsibility
for
the defense of
each
member and responsible for harm any
member does to outsiders. If
there is a confrontation,
families face families, lineage faces lineage, clan faces clan, tribe
faces tribe, confederacy faces confederacy, sect faces sect, and the
Islamic community faces the infidels. Deterrence
lies in the
balance between opponents.
Any potential aggressor knows
that his target is
not solitary or meagre but rather, at least in principle, a formidable
formation much the same size as his.”
Balanced
opposition is a "tribal" form of organization, a tribe being a regional
organization of defense
based on decentralization and self-help.
Tribes operate
differently from states, which are centralized, have political
hierarchies, and have specialized institutions—such
as
courts, police, tax collectors, and an army—to maintain
social
control and defense. (Tribal
DNA)
(gma emphasis)
*
In
kinship or tribal group disputes with an outsider, success in attaining
an objective or ambition by one family or group is viewed as a loss for
or restriction upon the other. It is a zero-sum game because failure
threatens tribal identity;
*
Low
level violence is an important mechanism of social control. It is proof
of serious intention and the will to proceed in the group interest no
matter what the rights or wrongs. If employed in retaliation
immediately after an alleged offence, it acts as a deterrent against
future attack;
*
However,
verbal threats of violence are used in Arab society to intimidate an
adversary without necessarily ending in violence; there is a proclivity
to substitute words for actions - a factor sometimes misunderstood in
Western society;
*
Leadership
is achieved not by election but by the male acquisition of power,
respect and authority arising out of conflict with and competition
among contemporaries. Leadership is therefore constantly challenged.
The power holder will mount challenges against other power holders
within his own group and his equals in the region;
*
Leaders
maintain their positions by the creation of reciprocal relationships
among their supporters. In return
for financial largesse and the appointment of family, friends and close
supporters to positions of power and wealth, the leader builds a
network of personal obligations towards himself. It was in this manner
that Yassir Arafat, supported by his Tunisian political dependants who
accompanied him to
the reverse, if it presents a challenge to the leader’s
authority;
*
In the
Arab world, the acquisition of honour, pride, dignity and respect and
the converse - avoidance of shame, disgrace and humiliation are major
keys to Arab motivation and justification of conduct.
“First,
fulfillment of obligations according to the dictates of lineage
solidarity achieves honor. Second, neutral mediators who resolve
conflicts and restore peace among tribesmen win honor. Third, victory
in conflicts between lineages in opposition brings honor. Violence
against outsiders is a well-worn path for those seeking honor. Success
brings honor. Winners gain; losers lose. Trying, short of success,
counts for nothing. In
Middle Eastern tribal culture, victims are despised, not
celebrated.” (Tribal
DNA)
The
honour-shame axis is particularly important in Arab culture as is
perceived arrogance on the part of an opponent who asserts a
counter-claim or an unjustified claim to honour.
These may have been crucial factors which constrained both President
Asad of
the June 4, 1967 lines despite UN Resolution 242 to the contrary;
Arafat was unable to retreat from the
political position regarding the ‘Right of Return’
into
which he had committed himself to the Palestinian masses.
Interestingly,
Kedar’s recent research into the emotive and psychological
elements of the speeches of Asad and others as published in the Syrian
press, shows a consistent reference to the following psychological
spectra: (see Chapter 6 especially)
*
Honour
versus Shame:
manifested in expressions of interpersonal communication, greetings and
in public behaviour such as hosting meetings, protocol positioning among
leaders for photo shots at public
gatherings
and among their respective entourages. Shame on the other hand
can
only be expunged by revenge. Failure
so to act results in the accrual of honour to the other side.
“Honor
for Arabs in the
can be increased by timely and effective action. …[The]
quest
for honor encourages or leads to offensive action by
individuals
or groups against others for [its] rewards …
[R]elations...are shaped by the
competition for honour” (Salzman p.107)
* Courage versus Fear: acts of bravery bring honour while fear expresses cowardice especially in war and discourages those who seek to escape the risks, hardships and losses which invariably follow.
*
Tenacity
versus Deference:
tenacity in maintaining the legitimacy of Arab demands while its
opponents –
*
Loyalty
versus Treachery:
loyalty to the Arab nation and the need for its protection versus
treachery for which the punishment is death.
They
illustrate the remarkable difference in Arab cultural values and
political postures from those expressed
generally in the West and in
In the resolution of a dispute, for example, the payment of
compensation for injury caused by a victor and its acceptance by the
victim brings honour to the victor and shame to the vanquished. Whereas
in Western society,
fair compensation for injury caused is accepted as being due on the
merits of the case without the factor of
shame entering the equation and having political
consequences.
This may to some degree explain why the Palestinian refugees have
continued to refuse compensation and rehabilitation in preference to
their continued assertion of a right of return. This has been
exacerbated by most of the countries in which they reside
where
they have not been given opportunities to become assimilated
–
employment, ownership of property and citizenship (Saltzman interview
24.07.08)
*
The
Arab mind tends to give greater weight to wishes expressed in thought
and speech than to what exists in reality;
to what he wishes
things to be, rather than to what they are objectively. (Patai, p.175)
Kedar
develops the last point - that what is wished in thought and speech
becomes a major part of the reality
in decision-making.
He considers emotion, rather than logic, as playing a more important
part in Arab society than in the West. Arab leaders choose their words
not as a mere rhetorical device to win support, but as a bonding
function between the ruler and the ruled. Leaders, such as Asad and
Arafat, did not present
themselves as the heads of government or revolutionary organisations.
“Rather
[they are] the object of an emotional relation, as an older brother, a
kindly father are revered teacher, a distinguished leader a source of
pride and a model to emulate; and from there it is only a small step to
“the sun of the nations”, infallible (ma’sum)
like Mohammad the Prophet, or the eternal ruler by the Grace of
God” (Kedar
p.
208)
It may be
fair
to conclude that Arab audiences identify with
their leaders, and in being persuaded by rhetoric tend
to be less analytical and critical than a western audience when
listening to speeches, promises and aspirations of their respective
leaderships. If this is so, it goes some way to explaining why Arab
political decision making tends
to be consensual rather than confrontational, thus hiding the real
divisions in society. However, even the emergence and creation of a
clear cut opposition with an agenda different from the then ruling
elites would not necessarily bring about a peaceful assumption of power
were it to win an election. Position and power in Arab society does not
purport to be based on meritocracy (as the West believes its system to
be so based) but on family and tribal connections.
In comparing segmentary societies, such as those of the traditional
Arabs, in contrast to complex Western societies,
“the
[former] base order on a balance of coercive potential and effective
force, each segment ready and able to mobilize and apply coercion in
defense of its interests, and rely on the deterrent influence of a
balance of force to maintain order. In these societies, [most] men are
warriors, and all men must concern themselves with effectively applying
coercion in defense of their interests. Facing a serious dispute or an
injury, threatened or actual, the men of a segment mobilize to act
militarily…”
[On the
other hand,] complex societies, based on divisions of labor among
specialized occupations, can support a state apparatus that claims to
monopolize legitimate coercive force.
Only agents of the state,
such as police and soldiers, are authorized to apply coercion on behalf
of the society at large, and self-help is outlawed.
Weapons and
skills training for coercion are largely restricted to agents of the
state. Formal procedures are instituted to draw upon established codes
for the peaceful resolution of disputes. Individuals in a conflict
commonly turn to lawsuits rather than taking direction action. Thus
most men in a complex society are not directly involved in the
maintenance of order. Physical coercion by agents of the state is
ideally restricted to the ultimate recourse and rarely should be
applied.” (Salzman, Iron
Law of Politics p.30)
This
dichotomy is characteristic of the Israeli–Palestinian
conflict
and raises the issue as to whether the two societies can ever
peacefully coexist alongside each
other without
a considerable
cultural shift in the traditional values of both.
For
Arabs,
power is decentralised and self-help provides the basis of security.
The bearing of arms is an expression of masculine maturity and the
right to resort to force is personal. The tribe helps provide
for
basic needs rather than the State, which is seen essentially as a
herdsman who shears (taxes) rather than tends (provides services) his
sheep (the civil population). The more remote state institutions are
from him, the greater the Arab freedom to set his own priorities and
needs – subject to those of his family, sect and
tribe. For
Arabs personal honour, freedom and equality reside outside the Rule of
Law, rather than subject to it, and appear to be more important than
peace. Indeed it is sometimes said that the underlying norm of Arab
society is that of war with intermediate periods of peace
In
contrast, for Jews tribal group-identity and allegiances do not
generally exist. Peace has a higher value for them; it is imprinted as
an intrinsic and continuous theme in Jewish prayers and daily language and
it is a constant, with war being
intermittent and even then only when thrust upon them. Although
equality tends
to be traded off in favour of personal freedom, communal obligations
imposed by the central power of the State try to redress the imbalance
between individuals. Conflict between individuals or between the rights
of the individual and those of the State are resolved by independent
courts of justice.
Traditionally the carrying of books rather than arms was the Jewish
norm. To the extent that military
training and weapons have become necessary for security, their
provision and legal use resides in the exclusive control and authority
of the State and is subject to its direction. So does the maintenance
of the public peace and good order. For Israeli Jews, their
political leadership is freely elected from among candidates who
present themselves as being capable as well as being accountable to the
electorate - at least in theory if not always in practice. If
they fail to gain re-election, power and authority is transferred
without violence to those who succeed to office. While the avoidance of
personal humiliation and loss of
face is important, it does not reach the same level as that in Arab
society
Matters
become more problematic when one of the societies advances its values
with a greater religious consciousness than the other. An even greater
chasm is created where the religious dogma of one group embraces death
and martyrdom in support of its cause while the other views the
sanctity of life as one of
its highest values.
2. Tribal
Influence in Islam, Islamic Religious Dogma and its View of the Jews
It is in
the context of early Arab tribalism that the power of Islam should be
viewed. Prior to the rise of Islam, Northern Arabian tribes engaged in
raiding, feuding and fighting among themselves for livestock,
territory, and honour.
Building on
the tribal system, Muhammad framed an inclusive structure within which
the tribes had a common, God-given identity as Muslims. This imbued the
tribes with a common interest and common project. But unification was
only possible by extending the basic tribal principle of balanced
opposition. This Muhammad did
by opposing the Muslim to the
infidel, and the dar al-Islam,
the
The basic tribal framework of "us versus them" remains in Islam.
Allegiance is to "my group" which is always defined against "the
other." Islam, according to Salzman is not a constant referent. It only
becomes relevant politically when Muslims encounter infidels. Among
Muslims, people will mobilise on a sectarian basis, such as Sunni
versus Shi‘a.
But it would be a mistake to assume
that because Arab sectarianism is in conflict, Western European and
Israeli interests will remain unaffected. Ultimately Arab segments will
unite (even if only temporarily) and mobilise according to whom they
find themselves in opposition.
Such
opposition may be created in a conflict over material and natural
resources (land and water) but fanned by Islamic religious dogma. From
its inception, the faith played and still plays an important part in
the Arab opposition to Jewish dominance of any sort in the
Thus, it is against a background of an Arab tribal culture upon which
Qur’anic doctrines have been superimposed that Palestinian
conflict with the Jewish State of Israel must be viewed.
The Qur’an,
as elaborated in Muslim exegetic literature,
including the hadith
and commentaries, extensively depicts Jews
in extremely negative terms. In the Islamic world view, as the price
for their obduracy in rejecting the message of Mohammed and committing
other transgressions against Allah’s will, Jews are cursed
and
are to be subjected to every possible human indignity.
The Qur’anic curse on the Jews appears in Sura 2 verse 61.
There
it recounts the biblical episode given in Exodus concerning the
Israelites’ complaints directed at Moses for the monotonous
diet
they received while in the desert instead of the fresh fruit and
vegetables they enjoyed in
the Qu’ran continues:
“Shame
and misery were stamped upon them [the Israelites] and they incurred
the wrath of Allah; because they disbelieved Allah’s signs
and
slew the Prophets unjustly; because they were rebels and
transgressors” (N.J. Dawood, Quoran,
Penguin
Books, 1998)
The Qu’ran
goes
further and directs that Jews are to be viewed as the devil’s
minions and on the Day of Judgment are to burn in hellfire
(Qur’an 4:55; 4:60)
The
Unbelievers among the People of the Book [Jews and Christians] and the
Pagans shall burn forever
in the fire of Hell. They are the vilest of all creatures
(Qur’an
98:7)
Recent research by Andrew Bostom on
the Qu’ran’s
attitude towards Jews and
its
historical application discloses four central themes:
* Jews are cursed by God,(Qu’ran 2.61) associated with Satan and consigned to Hell (Qur’an 4:60; 4:55;58:14-19;98:6);
*
Unless
they converted to Islam, Christians and Jews especially, are subject to
the compulsory payment of the Qur’anic poll tax (jizya)
which had to be made “readily.” (Qur’an,
2:61, 3:112
and 9:29);
*
the
Jews are cursed for killing the Prophets [Jesus and Mohammed]
(Qu’ran 5:78) and being “laden
with God’s anger” thus merit punishment at the
hands of
Islam by suffering permanent “abasement and
humiliation”;
(Qur’an 2:61; 3:112); and
*
transformation
of the Jews into apes and swine as part of that punishment.
(Qu’ran 2:65;5:60;5:78;7:116)
(Andrew G. Bostom, Antisemitism in the Qur’an: Motifs and Historical Manifestations, http://www.jihadwatch.org/dhimmiwatch/archives/020584.php ;Textbook Islamic Antisemitism http://www.americanthinker.com/2008/06/textbook_islamic_antisemitism.html
-hereinafter “Bostom”)
Consistent
with the Qu’ranic commandments to humiliate non-believers,
orthodox and fundamentalist Muslim clerics and their adherents
categorise Jews and Christians as “dhimmi”s
(“protected”). During the early period of Arab
expansion,
conquered infidel people were compelled either to convert to Islam or
suffer death. Jews
and Christians, however, being “People of The Book”
were
not viewed as infidels and were permitted to continue to practise
Judaism or Christianity, provided that they paid the jizya
poll
tax and
acknowledged the supremacy of Islam.
While both
Jews and Christians are classed as dhimmis,
whose social
status far inferior to that of even the lowliest Muslim,
the
Qur’anic attitude towards Christians was more favourable that
expressed of the Jew:
“Thou
will surely find the most hostile of men to the believers [Muslims],
are the Jews and the idolators;
and thou will surely find the nearest of them in love to the believers
are those who say ‘We are Christians’; that,
because some
of them are priests and monks and they wax not
proud”
(Qur’an 5:82)
The more benevolent Muslim attitude
towards Christians is rooted in two factors: (a) Jewish antipathy
towards Moslems in the early stage of Islam’s development and
(b)
Jewish attitudes against miscegenation.
According to al Jahiz, a mid 19th
century Islamic
commentator:
*
The
first Islamic emigrants exiled from
plunged into an open declaration of enmity so that the Muslims
mobilised their forces, exerting themselves morally and materially to
banish the Jews and destroy them…The Christians, however,
because of their remoteness from
*
Muslim
observations of the low status of Jewish occupations led them to
conclude that the Jewish religion must therefore be similarly
unfavourable. What is even more objectionable from al Jahi’z
perspective, is the low incidence of Jewish intermarriage with other
races which has resulted in lower intellectual and physical qualities
amongst Jews than in other races.
[T]hat
their unbelief must be the foulest of all, since they are the filthiest
if nations. Why the Christians, ugly as they are, are physically less
repulsive than the Jews, may be explained by the fact that the Jews, by
not intermarrying, have intensified the offensiveness of their
features.
Exotic elements have not mingled with them; neither have males of alien
races had intercourse with their women, nor have their men cohabitated
with females of foreign stock. The Jewish race therefore has been
denied high mental qualities sound physique and superior lactation. The
same regulars obtain when horses, camels donkeys and pigeons are inbred
mingled with them.”
(cited in Bostom)
Dhimmititude
brought
with it many civil indignities disabilities in the Islamic world which
was enforced with varying degrees of intensity over the centuries. In
most Islamic Arab lands, Jews were ritually and systematically
humiliated in fulfilling their obligation to pay the poll tax. After
making the payment publicly in the town square to the tax collection
authority in a subservient manner, the Jew was slapped in the face or
beaten on the neck and pushed forward to demonstrate that he was being
spared the sword. The public abasement was more important than the sum
paid.
The need
for Jewish services - especially financial - by local Arab dignitaries
was reflected in the indignity which they inflicted on their Jewish
inferiors. Although in a number of cases, Jews rose to positions of
importance, such as vizier to the Mongol ruler in Badhdad during the 13th
century and the Jewish vizier in Fez, Morocco in 1464, Jews often acted
as imperial tax collectors and as such became a bulwark between the
government on the one hand and the Arab masses on the other, from whom
it distanced itself. When anti-government riots occurred, as they did
in the streets of
In addition
to the special poll tax, dhimmis
were required to wear
distinctive clothing showing their lowered status; they were not
permitted to hold any governmental office of honour; their religious
buildings had to be lower than those of Islam and their religious
devotions were not permitted to be heard in public. Muslims took
precedence to Jews while walking in public streets. In riding, Jews
were restricted to the use of donkeys rather than horses as a sign of
their lowered status. Thus the possibility of Jewish dominance arising
- in even a smallest part of Islamic territory “dar
Islam”
- was and still is anathema to a Moslem fundamentalist.
(See:
Bat Ye’or The
Dhimmi: Jews and Christians Under Islam,
Associated University Press, Cranbury, NJ, 1985; Islam
and
Dhimmitude: Where civilisations Collide
Associated University
Press, Cranbury NJ, 2002 )
In Morocco for example, even in the
second decade of the 20th
century, Jews upon entering the
palace at dar el Maghzen
on business, whether on behalf of the
Jewish community or otherwise privately, were compelled, upon entering,
to remove their shoes and walk barefoot in the Palace and its courtyard
until they exited. Only when
For all Muslims, not just the
extremist fundamentalists, the Qu’ran remains the infallible
word
of God, valid for all time and all places. Its ideals are absolutely
true and beyond criticism. Thus, contemporary Qu’ranic
commentators, such as Mawdudi, assert that the Jews and Christians have
corrupted their faith since they have distorted certain basic
components of Islam.
The purpose for which Muslims are
required to fight is not to compel unbelievers to embrace Islam, but
“to put an end to the sovereignty and supremacy of the
unbelievers so that the latter are unable to rule over men. The
authority to rule should only be vested in those who follow the true
faith; unbelievers who do not follow this true faith should live in a
state of subordination.” (cited in Bostom)
Were the
above views to be considered those of a relatively few extremists, the
Middle East conflict
between
particularly following the 1967 Six Day War, Arab anti-Jewish
sentiments have become more vocally
strident and vicious. The Friday morning sermons emanating from Saudi
Arabian and Islamic centres
indicate that the above motifs remain vibrant in popular Islamic
religious teaching.
As will be demonstrated later, American and European political
leadership assumes that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be
resolved by
With this mindset there is little likelihood of any voluntary and
peaceful resolution of the
This demands that Israeli and Western leaders recognise and take into
account in their decision-making a number of social, political and
cultural factors inherent in Arab society as differing significantly
from their own.
In those regional and global political arenas where there appears to be
a religious and moral vacuum (and a continuing need for oil at almost
any price), the expansion of Islamic values and ideology is already
becoming increasingly prevalent. These may become dominant in the not
too distant future such that Arab dreams, wishes, thoughts and speech
will bear directly upon their political actions and become a major part
of the
reality in Arab decision-making.
(Haviv Rettig,
Report
on Muslim anti-Semitism,
Jerusalem Post, April
23, 2008; Nassim
Nicholas Taleb The
Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, Penguin
Books, London, 2007; Fouad Ajami, The
Dream Palace of the Arabs,
Vintage Books, New York,
1999; Andrew Hammond, Islamic
Caliphate a Dream, Not Reality,
Reuters, December 13, 2006 http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L04275477.htm)
3. Pre 1967 Palestinian-Arab Cultural and Political Identity
most of the population after the Muslim invasions of the seventh
century, no independent Arab or Palestinian state has ever existed in
the territory called
When the Jews began to immigrate to
late immigrants or descendants of persons who had immigrated into
(Carl Voss, “The
Palestine Problem Today, Israel and its
Neighbours” Beacon
Press 1953 cited in Bard)
Prior to partition in 1948, Palestinian Arabs did not view themselves
as having a separate identity. When the First Congress of
Muslim-Christian Associations met in
We consider
This
perception of Palestine persisted even after World War I, when in
"There
is no such country [as
As late
as
1947 the political perspective of the Arabs in
southern Syria."
Palestinian
Arab nationalism is largely a post-World War I creation but it did not
become as a significant political movement until after the 1967 Six-Day
War when Palestinian-Arab terrorist organisations emerged as the
embodiment of their vision for self-determination to be
realised
by violent struggle. The adoption of a distinctive Palestinian identity
was forged initially during the first Intifada, (1987–1993)
while
the resort to violence in the attainment of self determination still
remains still remains a potent element as ever in Arab culture and
Palestinian segmentary society. This topic will be examined
in
depth in a later Chapter
(see
Tal Beker,
Self-Determination in Perspective: Palestinian Claims
to Statehood and the Relativity of the Right of Self-Determination,
(1998) 32 Israel L. rev. 301)
4. Emerging
Issues flowing from Arab Cultural Characteristics
The above brief introductory
discussion on Arab cultural characteristics, tribal spirit and
loyalties, the unifying force of Islam and that of Palestinian identity
raises a number of important issues which will emerge with greater
prominence as the historical, political and legal aspects of the
Arab-Israeli conflict develop.
*
Palestinian
Identity and Interest Differentiated from other Arabs
Under Ottoman, British and Jordanian rule, the Palestinians had not
displayed any characteristics significantly different from those of the
Arab population in Jordan and Syria. It was only after the Six Days War
that a significant Arab population came under Jewish-Israeli control
and Arabs living in Judea and
of Israel, the Palestinians are a sufficiently differentiated people
not only from the Israelis but also from the populations of the other
neighbouring Arab states to justify and sustain a claim in
international law for self determination as an independent viable state
politically and economically.
*
Concentration
of Power
As been shown above, in Arab society honour and power are
intertwined and the exercise of power is
decentralised. In the West, by way of contrast, the exercise of power
is not only the exclusive preserve of
state governments but in international conflicts, there are political
moves towards extending the centralisation
of the exercise of power in the hands of the United Nations or under
the auspices. Such tendency appears to be at
odds with Arab–Islamic values as seen recently in
*
Arab
Customs in the Initiation and Conduct of War Diverge from those
Pertaining in the West
Even if the
resolution of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is
unattainable by negotiation, and the
parties continue to resort to violence, given their cultural and
religious differences, it is necessary to review
afresh whether contemporary rules and customs of international law in
relation to war and the pacific
settlement of international disputes can be truly applied to a clash
between Islam and the West.
As will be shown in Chapter VI and subsequent Chapters, the
movement to establish the
and its successor, the United Nations, as new international
institutions dedicated to pacific resolution of
international disputes were led by Western statesmen. Although the
customs and norms in relation to the
initiation and conduct of war may now be seen as secular they
nonetheless developed out of Christian western values, namely,
o
maintaining a
distinction between combatants and
non-involved ‘civilians’
o
military necessity, and
o
proportionality.
These
values form the bedrock of western military culture but they have no
express parallel in Arab tribal
‘military’ culture and tradition. There,
the bearing
of arms is considered a sign of masculinity in the protection
of personal, family and tribal honour, as are their women and children.
However, in
confronting a non-Muslim enemy, war - Jihad
- expresses
a religious rather than a nationalist
objective. Persons who do not submit to the dominance of Islam may
become legitimate targets: combatants
do not appear to be differentiated from non-combatants; males are slain
while females are taken into captivity
for purposes of reproduction to maintain the strength of the tribe or
clan.
A recent Arab declaration on the subject of Jihad declares
“the
sanctity of the blood of women, young children, and elderly infidels is
not absolute. There are cases
under which it is permitted to kill them, if they are part of a nation
of war….[I]f only one of these
circumstances holds true, then he must permit the operations because
the circumstances are not
conditional upon fulfilling all of them, but only one will suffice.
…
Muslims are permitted to kill infidel innocents reciprocally; if the
infidels are targeting the women, the young children and the elderly
Muslims, then it is permissible for the Muslims to act reciprocally,
and kill just as
they were killed. in Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, and other
places”
(Communique from Qu’idat al- Jihad Concerning the Testaments
of
the Heroes and the Legality of the
Washington and New York Operations, April 24,
*
The
objectives of fundamentalist Islam are in conflict with the Western
notion of the illegality of resorting to
war except in self defence or in accordance with UN Security Council
resolutions. For Islam, a higher value is
the submission of all peoples to the will of Allah which is to be
achieved by jihad if
necessary.
(Muhammad
And The Treaty Of Hudaybiyya,
http://www.answering-islam.org/Silas/hudaybiyya.htm;
Holy Prophet’s Life, Joint
Conspiracy of Qoraish and Jews
and Ghazwah Ahzab http://www.anwary-islam.com/prophet-life/holly-p-13.htm
;see also http://www.historyofjihad.com/
)
See particularly David Cook, Understanding
Jihad,
*
Even
the accepted Western principle that agreements and international pacts
are to be observed by all parties
is in conflict with Islamic tradition and values.
Islamists who, for the time being,
may be unable to overcome
stronger infidel opponents and decide therefore, for strategic reasons,
to enter into a truce or even a peace agreement with such opponents,
are permitted by Arab cultural and religious tenets to breach that
agreement
if at some later date the earlier Islamists’ position of
weakness
is reversed to one of superiority.
(see Treaty
of Hudabeya http://www.witnesspioneer.org/vil/Articles/companion/19_ali_bin_talib.htm;
Denis MacEoin, Tatical
Hudna and Islamic Intolerance, Middle
East Quarterly, Summer pp.39-84 http://www.meforum.org/article/1925
)
Thus, to what extent should
*
Assuming
that the European and Western powers see
themselves as possessing a unified western-orientated cultural system
and identity and wish to differentiate themselves from other peoples in
the Middle and Far East – a questionable assumption today
–
they view
Given the
above factors it is difficult to fathom why
Israel, as a small and western-oriented Jewish state lying within dar
Islam but dependant to a large
extent for her continued security
on the support of the United States, seems to constitute an impediment
to the
realisation of Western interests and can therefore be sacrificed in the
arena of public opinion
In contrast to Arab society, public opinion in Western democratic
societies exercises a powerful influence in governmental and
non-government organisational decision-making. Public opinion is
moulded by public relations, information and propaganda campaigns
operating overtly and covertly in Western civil society.
“Acting contrary to international law” has become a
mantra
in media communications employed by one antagonist to advance
its political platform or objectives and to malign or destroy those of
its opponents. Initially dominated by the ‘fourth
estate’
comprising newspapers, radio and television, this arena is slowly being
eclipsed by emergent interactive internet websites and linkages. They
have the potential to exert a major influence on national
decision-making not only in western democratic states but have even
more potential in promoting the free
flow of information in non-democratic states. On the other
hand
both news media and cyberspace activists
are not accountable to any institution or constituency for the veracity
of their communications.
In evaluating an assertion that a State, such as Israel, is
“acting contrary to international law,” the
addressee must
be in a position to know not only the factual background on which the
accusations are based but also
what provisions of international law are allegedly being violated. It
is often the case that the specific
international legal proposition in question is inapplicable in the
territory where an apparent violation has
occurred or that the State alleged to be in violation has not acceded
to the treaty or Convention in which the norm or principle was
formulated; thus opening the way for uninformed and unjustified
condemnation.
With the
foregoing considerations in mind, Chapter VI is designed to assist and
hopefully enable the reader to assess the validity of what is alleged
to be in accordance with or contrary to international law or, if this
is impossible, it is hoped that the material presented may place the
reader at least in a better position to question the assertion being
advanced.
However
in
order to assess the legality of subsequent Israeli actions, it is still
necessary to examine in a little more detail the political, demographic
and economic conditions which prevailed in Palestine prior to the
end
World War I and to assess their effect upon Palestinian Arab claims of
the being dispossessed of their land by early Jewish land acquisition
and immigration. These claims are examined in the Chapter IV following
next.
Home | Introduction | Chapter 1 | Chapter 2 | Chapter 3 | Chapter 4 | Chapter 5 | Chapter 6 |